Funding Terrorism: The Problem of Ransom Payments by Dutton, Yvonne M.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 53 
Issue 2 2016 Article 4 
7-4-2016 
Funding Terrorism: The Problem of Ransom Payments 
Yvonne M. Dutton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yvonne M. Dutton, Funding Terrorism: The Problem of Ransom Payments, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 335 
(2016). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol53/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 



















    
    
 






I. 	INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................335 

II. 	THE RISE OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM TO FUND TERRORISM..................340 

III. 	THE NO-CONCESSIONS POLICY AND THE RECENT MEASURES 

CALLING FOR A UNIVERSAL TERRORIST RANSOM BAN.............................345 

A. The No-Concessions Policy and its Underlying Rationale ............345 

B. The Recent Calls for a Universal Terrorist Ransom Ban...............348 

C. Legally-Binding or Not: A Textual Analysis ..................................350 

IV. 	MAKING THE CASE FOR THE RECENT MEASURES: NORM INFLUENCE ........355 

A. Norm Influence and the Terrorist Ransom Ban Measures .............355 

B. Considering the Alternative: Force Instead of Persuasion ............358 

1. 	 Obstacles to a Legally-Binding Terrorist Ransom  

Ban Directed at Governments.................................................359 

2. 	 Obstacles to a Legally-Binding Terrorist Ransom Ban 

Directed at Individuals ...........................................................361 

V.	 THE WAY FORWARD: MORE PERSUASION ................................................366 

I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2009, kidnappers captured four Westerners who were part of 
a tour group traveling on holiday in West Africa.1  The tourists were 
returning to Niger after attending a cultural festival in Mali when kidnappers
* © 2016 Yvonne Dutton.  Associate Professor, Indiana University Robert H.
McKinney School of Law.  Please do not cite or share without permission. 
1. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ORGANISED MARITIME PIRACY AND RELATED
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM 27 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FATF Report].
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began shooting at their vehicles.2  One vehicle managed to escape, but the 
one containing a German woman, a Swiss couple, and a British man was 
disabled by the gunfire.  The kidnappers moved the four Westerners to a 
neighboring country.3  Although some reports indicate that a nomadic 
rebel group carried out the initial capture, ultimately the terrorist group al 
Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took charge of ransom 
negotiations.4  AQIM initially offered to exchange the British hostage, 
Edwin Dyer, for a high-level terrorist group member imprisoned in Britain.5 
When the British government rejected that offer, AQIM followed with a 
demand for approximately ten million euros to release Mr. Dyer and one
of the Swiss hostages.6  That demand too went unmet, and AQIM executed
Mr. Dyer.7  The German and Swiss hostages did not suffer the same fate 
as Mr. Dyer:  they were eventually released, reportedly in exchange for
ransom payments totaling about eight million euros.8 
This tragic story is but one of many that illustrates how a country’s
ransom policy can affect the likelihood that its citizens will survive a 
kidnapping for ransom by a terrorist organization.  Britain, like the United 
States, has a no-concessions policy and will not pay to have citizens 
released.9  Both countries defend their policies, arguing that paying
ransoms merely fuels and funds further attacks, thereby putting more 
2. Rukmini Callimachi, Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming­
citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html?_r=0.
3. Id.; 2011 FATF Report, supra note 1.
 4. Id.
 5. See Xan Rice & Robert Booth, Al-Qaida Group Demands Release of Abu 
Qatada or British Hostage Will be Killed, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2009, 7:01 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/27/alqaida-north-africa-hostages [https://perma.cc/ 9NKQ­
DADZ].
 6. Matthew Weaver, British Hostage Edwin Dyer ‘Killed by Al-Qaida,’ 
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2009, 5:11 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/jun/03/edwin­
dyer-hostage-killed-al-qaida [https://perma.cc/MN44-NGWP]. 
7. Id. (quoting a statement from AQIM indicating that Mr. Dyer was killed “so 
that he, and with him the British state, may taste a tiny portion of what innocent Muslims 
taste every day at the hands of the crusader and Jewish coalition to the east and to the 
west.”). 
8. Callimachi, supra note 2.
 9. See Lizzie Deardon, Steven Sotloff Beheaded: David Cameron Under Pressure
to Negotiate with ISIS After Threat to Kill British Hostage, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/steven-sotloff-beheaded-david­
cameron-under-pressure-to-negotiate-with-isis-after-threat-to-kill-british-hostage-970
7786.html [https://perma.cc/F2M2-A9D6] (stating that the British “no concessions” policy
dates from the 1970s); Press Statement, Richard Boucher, U.S. Dep’t of State, Int’l Terrorism:
American Hostages (Feb. 20, 2002), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8190. 
htm [https://perma.cc/G7Y8-X7AL] [hereinafter Boucher Statement] (referencing the U.S.
policy).
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innocent individuals at risk of being taken hostage in the future.10  Nor do 
these countries back down when confronted with the reality that their
citizens have been murdered at the hands of terrorists.  In the aftermath of 
AQIM’s execution of Mr. Dyer, Britain’s Prime Minister Gordon Brown
said, “This tragedy reinforces our commitment to confront terrorism . . . 
and strengthens our determination never to concede to the demands of 
terrorists, nor to pay ransoms.”11  The United States stands by its policy 
even after the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) executed two American 
journalists in late 2014, and states that its policy is not coldhearted,
but instead is designed to protect U.S. citizens by depriving terrorist
organizations of the funds they need to carry out future terrorist acts.12 
Although other countries deny paying ransoms, the evidence suggests 
otherwise.  Reports indicate that between 2008 and 2014, European countries
paid more than $100 million in ransom payments to al Qaeda and its 
affiliates.13  The payments are made in secret, but the benefits obtained 
are readily apparent:  the citizens of these countries return home, rather than
suffer gruesome deaths at the hands of terrorists.14  Commentators, however, 
charge that those who pay are causing greater long-term damage in that 
10. See, e.g., PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, THE THREAT POSED BY KIDNAPPING FOR 
RANSOM BY TERRORISTS AND THE PREVENTIVE STEPS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
CAN TAKE (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-summit-kidnapping­
for-ransom-by-terrorists-extract-of-communique/the-threat-posed-by-kidnapping-for­
ransom-by-terrorists-and-the-preventive-steps-the-international-community-can-take
[https://perma.cc/V3FD-6RRC] (stating ransom payments constitute a source of income
that supports the recruitment efforts of terrorist groups and strengthens their capacity to 
carry out future attacks, all of which increases the risk to British nationals); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on ‘Confronting
New Threats in Terrorist Financing’ (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ 
press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y6X5-UJTG] [hereinafter Cohen Statement]
(“Refusing to pay ransoms or to accede to other terrorist demands is the surest way to 
convince potential hostage-takers that they will not be rewarded for their crime.”). 
11. Weaver, supra note 6.
 12. See Rob Garver, U.S. Says a No-Ransom Policy Could Weaken ISIS, FISCAL 
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2014/10/23/US-Says-No-Ransom­
Policy-Could-Weaken-ISIS [https://perma.cc/93XB-DUYB] (quoting David Cohen, Under
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence).
13. Callimachi, supra note 2.
 14. See, e.g., id. (reporting on the release of the Swiss and German hostages held 
along with Mr. Dyer); Charles Bremner, France Pays Ransom to al-Qaeda for Last Hostage,
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/ 
article4292595.ece [https://perma.cc/Z9GK-LZJW] (reporting that France paid for the
release of a 16th citizen being held hostage by an al Qaeda affiliate).
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they are helping terrorist organizations stay in business because of their
regular—albeit secret—ransom payments.15 Apart from state sponsorship, 
kidnapping for ransom has become the largest source of terrorist funding.16 
Recently, concerns about the increased role ransoms play in funding 
terrorism have led to calls for a universal policy banning ransom payments 
to terrorists.  In June 2013, the Group of Eight (G8) leaders issued a 
communiqué in which they recognized that ransom payments to terrorists 
help strengthen the organization and fund future incidents of kidnapping
for ransom.17  The G8 leaders accordingly “welcome[d] efforts to prevent 
kidnapping and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom
payments.”18  In January 2014, the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously adopted a resolution expressing concern about the increase 
in terrorist kidnappings for ransom and the fact that the ransom payments 
fund future hostage-takings.19  It further called on states to prevent terrorists
from benefiting from ransom payments and to work with the private sector
so that it would respond to kidnappings without paying ransoms.20 
Additional Security Council resolutions referencing a ransom ban have 
followed.21 
What, though, is the import of these recent measures? Analysis of the
text of the communiqué and the resolutions shows that they do not create
clear, binding, and enforceable obligations on states to refuse to pay ransoms 
to terrorists. This means that there is also reason to expect that states that
have previously acceded to terrorist ransom demands or permitted their
citizens to pay ransoms to terrorists may not change their behavior.  Thus,
these recent measures present a puzzle: namely, if they are not obligatory
and backed by enforcement mechanisms to hold states accountable, why
were they adopted? 
15. Callimachi, supra note 2 (stating that “Europe has become an inadvertent
underwriter of Al Qaeda” through its ransom payments); see also David Blair, France 
Boosted Al-Qaeda in Mali by Paying £11 million in Ransoms, Says US Ambassador,
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 8, 2013, 2:36 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africa 
andindianocean/mali/9857723/France-boosted-al-Qaeda-in-Mali-by-paying-11m-in-ransoms­
says-US-ambassador.html (quoting a former US Ambassador to Mali as saying that various 
European governments paid ransoms to AQIM for the release of their citizens and that the 
monies were used to help the terrorist organization buy weapons, grow stronger, and recruit 
members).
16. Cohen Statement, supra note 10. 
17. G8 Lough Erne Leader Communiqué, June 18, 2013, ¶ 75, http://www.g8.utoronto.
ca/summit/2013lougherne/lough-erne-communique.html [https://perma.cc/T7UE-642K]
[hereinafter G8 Communiqué].
18. Id. at ¶ 77.
19.  S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 6 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
20.  S.C. Res. 2133, ¶¶ 3, 10 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
21. S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 17 (Aug. 15, 2014); S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ ¶ 19-20 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
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This Article draws on the literature about norm influence22 to suggest 
an answer: adopting these measures has the potential to impact behavior 
in a meaningful and constructive way in the future. A norm refers to the 
appropriate or desired behavior within a community as to a particular 
issue.23  A new norm spreads with the help of agents, typically referred to 
as norm entrepreneurs,24 who use persuasion to convince a critical mass
of actors in the international community to adopt the preferred behavior.25 
In other words, over time, norms can become so pervasive that they
change behavior.26 
In fact, this Article suggests that the only realistic avenue to produce 
change in this context is through persuasion, as opposed to force.  Consider 
the ethical dilemma.  Even if a state is comfortable enforcing its own no- 
concessions policies, why would it want to assume the ethical burden of 
forcing another state to sacrifice the lives of its citizens? States may feel
similarly as regards the private sector: while they may not want the private
sector to pay ransoms, punishing individuals who pay under duress for the 
safe return of their loved ones is not generally consistent with the criminal 
law: it seems ethically and morally wrong.  Urging states and citizens to
refuse to pay ransoms because doing so serves the greater goals of depriving
terrorists of funding and the motivation for future kidnappings is a 
22. See generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG.. 887, 895 (1998) (explaining norm 
influence as a three-stage process that involves, norm emergence, norm acceptance, and 
norm internalization).
23. Id. at 891 (“[N]orms involve standards of ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper behavior.’”); 
see also W. Andy Knight, The Development of the Responsibility to Protect—From 
Evolving Norm to Practice, 3 GLOBAL RESP. PROTECT 3, 18 (2011) (“Norms can therefore 
be understood as . . . standards or patterns of behavior that proscribe and prescribe the 
appropriateness of a given act.”). 
24. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 896–97 (defining norm entrepreneurs 
as the critical agents who call attention to and frame issues so as to usher in a new norm 
reflecting an alternative and more appropriate standard of conduct). 
25. See, e.g., Simon Rushton, The UN Secretary-General and Norm Entrepreneurship: 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Democracy Promotion, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 95, 98 
(2008) (citing Finnemore & Sikkink). 
26. Finnemore and Sikkink, for example, note that “[w]omen’s suffrage . . . began 
as a demand for domestic change in a handful of countries and eventually became an 
international norm.”  Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 893.  Knight traces the 
development of a “responsibility to protect” norm over many years and argues that there 
is now some evidence that the norm is being institutionalized.  Knight, supra note 23, at 
32–34. 
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different matter.  When one urges, as opposed to forces, one does not assume
the ultimate decision of whether to pay or not. 
The section that follows provides some background on the rise in kidnapping
for ransom to finance terrorism, including a description of how the funds 
are used to help some groups and further their terrorist activities. The 
remaining sections seek to explain the puzzle identified above: why the 
G8 states would issue a communiqué and why the Security Council would 
adopt resolutions that do not create clear and binding obligations backed
by enforcement measures to hold states accountable should they fail to 
adhere to—and make their citizens adhere to—a terrorist ransom ban. 
II. THE RISE OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM TO FUND TERRORISM
In the last several years, kidnapping27 for ransom (KFR) has become a
main source of terrorist funding, with some groups collecting tens of 
millions of dollars from ransoms.28  Apart from state sponsorship, as of
2014, KFR has become the “greatest source of terrorist funding and the
most challenging terrorist financing threat.”29  According to the Financial
Action Task Force, KFR is now considered by 
law enforcement agencies worldwide as a significant source of revenue for
terrorist groups often operating in politically unstable countries where central 
authority is often weak, public and private corruption is endemic, and the social
fabric of those nations has unraveled to a considerable degree.30
 27. Kidnapping refers to confining a person against her will without legal authority.
Kidnapping for ransom means that the perpetrators seek some financial or political
consideration, such as the payment of money or the release of prisoners, before they will 
free the confined individual. See 2011 FATF Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 58. 
28. See, e.g., Cohen Statement, supra note 10; Memorandum from the Global
Counterterrorism Forum on Good Practices in Preventing and Denying the Benefits of
Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/
159874/Algiers+Memorandum-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA7A-NENF] [hereinafter
Algiers Memorandum].  The Global Counterterrorism Forum was formed in 2011 and is 
comprised of member states that work closely with the United Nations with the goal of
implementing the U.N.’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It provides advice to address 
counterterrorism challenges with the help of senior policy makers and experts on
counterterrorism from around the world.  See About the GCTF, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM 
FORUM, https://www.thegctf.org/web/guest/mission [https://perma.cc/X6KU-AY92] (last
visited June 11, 2016). 
29. Cohen Statement, supra note 10. 
30. 2011 FATF Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 49. The Financial Action Task Force is
an intergovernmental policy-making organization that issues non-binding, but influential, 
recommendations to “promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational 
measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to 
the integrity of the international financial system.” See About: Who We Are, FATF, http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/FU3R-Q96Z] (last visited June 11, 2016). 
Since its creation in 1989, FATF has grown to include thirty-six member countries. See 
340
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Experts suggest that the recent uptick in KFR as a source of terrorist 
funding can be linked to the international community’s relative success in
implementing measures that have stemmed the flow of traditional funding 
sources—namely, contributions from states, organizations, and individuals.31 
For example, since the September 11th attacks, individual states and the 
international community have enforced a powerful regime of sanctions 
against terrorist organizations and those who fund them.32  They have also 
enforced regulations to increase financial transparency so that terrorist 
organizations can no longer easily move funds through banks or other 
financial institutions.33  The good news is that these methods have proved
successful in eradicating some forms of terrorist financing.  The bad news 
is that some terrorist groups have found that employing kidnapping for
ransom as a funding tactic can bring in millions.34 
In fact, the ransoms paid to al Qaeda and its affiliates between 2008 and 
2014 total more than $125 million.35  In 2014 alone, ISIS36 apparently took 
About: Members & Observers, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersand
observers/ [https://perma.cc/GRP7-JVRL] (last visited June 11, 2016).
31. See Cohen Statement, supra note 10. 
32. See, e.g., id.
 33. Id.; see also Associated Press, Cash Strapped Al Qaeda Turns to Kidnapping
and Ransoms to Pay Operational Costs, FOX NEWS (June 19, 2011), http://www.fox
news.com/world/2011/06/19/turn-to-kidnapping-showed-bin-ladens-interest/ [https://perma. 
cc/QJ9A-4KP9] (quoting a U.S. official as stating that information in files found in Osama
bin Laden’s compound is consistent with other evidence showing that al Qaeda is pursuing
kidnappings for ransom as a way to reline its declining coffers).
34.  Algiers Memorandum, supra note 28. 
35. Callimachi, supra note 2.
36. Historically, ISIS traces back to the Iraq faction of al Qaeda—al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI). AQI was weakened in Iraq in 2007 as a result of  “Awakening,” fighting against the
terrorist organization that was supported by the United States.  With the Syrian conflict 
that started in 2011, AQI moved into Syria and began expanding its ranks.  By 2013, the 
group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, spread the group’s influence back into Iraq and
changed its name to ISIS.  ISIS and its leader have had a falling out with al Qaeda’s
leadership, and since early 2014, the group operates independently of al Qaeda.  ISIS is 
also known by the name ISIL, which stands for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. ISIS: 
Trail of Terror, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/fullpage/isis-trail-terror-isis­
threat-us-25053190 [https://perma.cc/58HT-PZWF] (last updated Feb. 23, 2015); Zachary
Laub & Jonathan Masters, Backgrounder: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811 [https://perma.cc/S8R4­
ALZB] (last updated May 18, 2015).  The group is also known as Daesh.  Felicia Schwartz, 
One More Name for Islamic State: Daesh, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 23, 2014, 12:04 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/23/one-more-name-for-islamic-state-daesh/. 
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in about $45 million in ransom payments.37  AQIM38 has also received 
substantial sums in exchange for its agreement to release the innocent
hostages it was holding: it received about $75 million in ransom payments
between 2010 and 2014.39  In terms of the individual ransom payments to
AQIM, they average over $6 million for the release of one hostage.40 
Another al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),41 
took in some $20 million in ransom payments between 2011 and 2013.42 
The evidence shows that these funds are used to sustain, and even grow, 
the organizations that collect them. Monies from ransom payments allow 
terrorist groups to recruit and indoctrinate new members, acquire sophisticated
weapons and communications gear such as satellite phones, establish training
camps and support units, including “safe houses” and transportation operations, 
as well as provide financial resources which can be used to bribe government 
officials, law enforcement personnel and others who can be of use to a terrorist 
organisation in conducting its nefarious activities.43 
The leader of AQAP wrote that half of the group’s “battle costs” come
from payments to release captured hostages.44  As to AQIM, government 
experts in Britain and the U.S. agree that KFR constitutes the group’s 
37. Associated Press, ISIS Received up to $45M in Ransom in Last Year, N.Y. POST
(Nov. 25, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/11/25/isis-received-up-to-45m-in­
ransom-in-last-year/ [https://perma.cc/85EK-FGSG] [hereinafter ISIS Received] (quoting 
a U.N. expert monitoring sanctions against al Qaeda).
38. AQIM is an al Qaeda affiliate that operates in the Sahara and the Sahel—a 
region that includes Niger, Mauritania, and Mali.  It seeks to rid North Africa of Western 
influence and install fundamentalist regimes based on sharia in Algeria, Libya, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.  The group’s tactics include “guerilla-style raids . . .
and suicide bombings of military government, and civilian targets.”  Zachary Laub &
Jonathan Masters, Backgrounder: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda­
islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717 [https://perma.cc/8XLR-U2KL] (last updated Mar. 27, 2015).
39. ISIS Received, supra note 37. 
40.  2011 FATF Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 60. 
41. Formed in 2009, AQAP is a union of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al 
Qaeda.  Analysts consider the group to be the most lethal franchise of al Qaeda, with close
to 1,000 members—up from about 300 members in 2009.  AQAP has claimed responsibility
for many attacks in the region where it operates.  It has also attempted to strike the United 
States homeland.  AQAP was the terrorist group behind the failed attempt to bomb a 
Detroit-bound jet on Christmas day 2009.  Like AQIM, AQAP’s mission is to “purge Muslim 
countries of Western influence” and install fundamentalist Islamist regimes. Backgrounder: 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.
org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369 [https://perma.cc/3538-7M3Q] (last updated 
June 19, 2015).
42. Isis Received, supra note 37. 
43.  2011 FATF Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 59.
44. Callimachi, supra note 2.
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primary source of revenue for its yearly budget of approximately fifteen
million euros.45 
Although there is not one standard way to conduct a kidnapping for 
ransom, recent kidnappings by al Qaeda affiliates follow a similar pattern.
First, the terrorist groups generally minimize the risks to group members
by outsourcing the initial hostage-taking to criminal organizations working 
on a commission.46  Once the terrorist group receives the hostages, it then 
observes a long period of silence designed to create some panic among the
hostage’s loved ones.47  For instance, ISIS kept the capture of journalist
James Foley secret for some sixteen months before the terrorists notified 
his family.48 
Thereafter, negotiations for a ransom begin, often with a video showing 
the hostages begging their governments to pay for the hostage’s safe 
release.49 Additional videos usually follow showing the hostages surrounded 
by armed guards in an effort to reinforce the group’s message that the 
hostage will be executed if their demands are not met. Ransom negotiations, 
which are apparently guided by al Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan 
even for kidnappings in Yemen and Mali, can drag out for months or even
years.50  Payments to the terrorist groups often happen with the aid of third
party intermediaries who negotiate and facilitate the transfer of ransom
payments into a designated bank account or through an alternative remittance
system, such as a hawala.51 As a former U.S. ambassador to Mali explains,
45.  2011 FATF Report, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 76–77. 
46. Callimachi, supra note 2; see also Julian Borger & Helen Pidd, Al-Qaida 
Murders British Tourist Seized in Mali, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2009, 4:23 PM), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/03/edwin-dyer-al-qaida-mali [https://perma.cc/9TEP-92TT]
(stating that Tuareq rebels captured Edwin Dyer and his fellow tourists and then sold the
hostages to AQIM). 
47. Callimachi, supra note 2.
 48. David Rohde, Did America’s Policy on Ransom Contribute to James Foley’s 
Killing?, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/david-rohde/2014/08/20/did­
american-policy-help-kill-james-foley/ [https://perma.cc/68NM-NQ54].
49. Callimachi, supra note 2; see also Al Qaeda Video Shows British-American 
Hostage, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014, 6:12 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda­
in-yemen-aqap-video-british-american-hostage-luke-somers/ [https://perma.cc/RPY6­
SJX3] (describing a video showing British-American hostage Luke Somers stating that 
AQAP had been holding him hostage for over one year and asking for help). 
50. Callimachi, supra note 2.
51. 2011 FATF Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 62. Hawala is a remittance system that
operates outside of traditional banking channels.  It relies on a system of trust and personal 
relationships, with transfers of money taking place based on communications between 
hawala dealers, often with no accompanying negotiable instruments. PATRICK M. JOST &
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governments use circuitous routes and pass the money indirectly through 
different accounts until it ends up in the terrorists’ hands.52 
A kidnapping can end with the release of the hostage if the hostage’s
government or loved ones succumb to the terrorist group’s ransom
demands.  Governments typically deny that they pay ransoms to terrorists. 
Yet although the details are often shrouded in secrecy, the evidence shows 
that the terrorist groups holding the citizens of some countries do receive 
hefty ransoms in order to free the hostages.53  For example, Switzerland
denied that it had paid a ransom for the release of the Swiss citizen who 
was held along with Mr. Dyer.  According to a source close to the transaction, 
however, the Swiss government budget thereafter contained an additional 
line item for humanitarian aid to Mali.54  France denied that it paid 
approximately $27 million in ransom for the release of four French citizens 
who had been captured by AQIM while working in Niger for the French
nuclear group, Areva. Nevertheless, a relative of a remaining victim said
that the government had told her that while France would not pay the
terrorists, the employer could do so.55  Others allege that the ransom funds
came from the coffers of France’s own Secret Service.56 
On the other hand, when the terrorists’ ransom demands are not met, the
usual outcome is a statement or a video released by the terrorists confirming 
the hostage’s gruesome death.57  Governments with no-concessions policies,
HARJIT SINGH SANDHU, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE HAWALA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE 
SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE IN MONEY LAUNDERING 5, http://www.treasury.gov/resource­
center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2T3­
WCX4].
52. See Alexandria Sage & Sophie Louet, France Plays Down Report of Ransom 
Paid for Niger Hostages, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2013, 3:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/02/08/us-france-hostages-idUSBRE9170YJ20130208 [https://perma.cc/ZN4F­
DH5H] (explaining that when France and other governments pay ransoms to AQIM, the 
money passes to the Malian government and then to the terrorists). 
53. Callimachi, supra note 2 (referencing the European governments’ denials that
they pay ransoms, but confirming payments from sources who spoke on the condition of 
anonymity). 
54. Susan Misicka, Pay or Let Die: Ransom Money Debate Heats Up, SWISS INFO
(July 30, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/pay-or-let-die—ransom-money­
debate-heats-up/40530660 [https://perma.cc/Z5QL-AMSB]. 
55. Abdoulaye Massalatchi & Nicholas Vinocur, France Denies Paying Ransom as
Sahel Hostages Return, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/10/30/us-france-niger-hostages-idUSBRE99T09220131030 [https://perma.cc/
MN6V-W57C].
56. Millions Paid to Free French AQIM Hostages, Report, RFI (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20131030-millions-paid-free-french-aqim-hostages-report 
[https://perma.cc/2RKZ-ZTQP] [hereinafter Millions Paid].
57. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 6 (referencing the terrorists’ message about the 
execution of British citizen, Edwin Dyer); Chelsea J. Carter, Video Shows ISIS Beheading 
U.S. Journalist James Foley, CNN NEWS (Aug. 20, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://www.cnn.
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like the United States, do launch military missions to rescue their citizens 
being held captive by terrorists.  Most of those missions, though, do not 
result in the safe return of the hostage.58  The United States’ attempt to 
rescue American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff from their
ISIS captors in Syria did not succeed.59  In December 2014, the United
States deployed dozens of Navy SEAL commandos in an effort to rescue 
an American photojournalist held hostage by AQAP in Yemen.  Nonetheless, 
the terrorists killed the American, Luke Somers, and his fellow hostage 
from South Africa, Pierre Korkie, when they realized that the rescue effort
was underway.60 
III. THE NO-CONCESSIONS POLICY AND THE RECENT MEASURES 

CALLING FOR A UNIVERSAL TERRORIST RANSOM BAN
 
A. The No-Concessions Policy and its Underlying Rationale 
As noted above, some countries like the United States and Britain have 
long adhered to a strict policy of granting no concessions to terrorists.61 
The United States emphasizes that while it will use all appropriate 
resources to gain the safe return of any hostages, the official policy is “to 
deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy 
changes, or other acts of concession.”62 The United States also urges its
citizens and businesses not to pay ransoms to terrorists, as does Britain.63 
Indeed, according to James Foley’s parents, the United States government 
threatened them with prosecution if they paid a ransom to ISIS for the 
com/2014/08/19/world/meast/isis-james-foley/index.html [https://perma.cc/976J-A7B2]
(referencing the release of a video showing the beheading of James Foley and ISIS’s threat 
to kill another American being held captive).
58. David Martin & Debora Patta, U.S.-led Hostage Rescues Rarely Successful, 
Always Dangerous, CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2014, 7:57 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
u-s-led-hostage-rescues-rarely-successful-always-dangerous/ [https://perma.cc/S4ZT-7S2L]. 
59.   Nicholas Schmidle, Inside the Failed Raid to Save Foley and Sotloff, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/inside-failed-raid­
free-foley-sotloff [https://perma.cc/P8WR-DR82]. 
60. Kareem Fahim & Eric Schmitt, 2 Hostages Killed in Yemen As U.S. Rescue 
Effort Fails, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/world/ 
middleeast/hostage-luke-somers-is-killed-in-yemen-during-rescue-attempt-american­
official-says.html. 
61. See supra Part I. 
62.  Boucher Statement, supra note 9. 
63. Id.; Joe Sinclair, Government’s Refusal to Negotiate Ransom Under Fire, PA
NEWS (Feb. 1, 2010). 
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release of their son.64  A government spokesperson, however, denied that
the State Department “told the family they could be prosecuted for paying 
ransom,” stating that the Department instead was only helping the family
“understand what our laws are about terrorists or paying ransom to
terrorists.”65 
Countries that adhere to such no-concessions policies argue that paying 
ransoms encourages additional kidnappings and also funds future acts of 
terrorism.  United States’ Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence, David S. Cohen, has stated that “there is no doubt that the 
payment of ransom just fuels the appetite for additional kidnapping
operations . . .” and refusing to pay ransoms helps “the people who are 
contemplating that tactic recognize that there is no pot of gold at the end
of the rainbow.”66  In his remarks to the United Nations Security Council
during a briefing on terrorism, Britain’s Foreign Secretary urged against 
regarding ransom payments to hostage takers as a “necessary evil,” and 
argued that paying millions to hostage takers will only “encourage more 
kidnaps and fund murder” since major attacks can be mounted for only 
tens of thousands of dollars.67  In September 2014, Prime Minister David
Cameron explained the country’s refusal to give in to ISIS’s ransom
demands, stating that ransom payments to the terrorist group are used to
promote terrorism.68 
There is no doubt that adhering to a strict policy against paying ransoms 
is costly—lives of innocent victims are lost in the short term. Recent
events well illustrate this fact. ISIS executed American journalist James 
64. Brian Ross et al., ‘So Little Compassion’: James Foley’s Parents Say Officials 




66. Interview by Chatham House with David S. Cohen, U.S. Under Sec’y for
Terrorism & Fin. Intelligence, in London, U.K. (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.chatham 
house.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/051012CohenQA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T6SP-FVWT] [hereinafter Cohen Q & A]; see also UN Urges End to
Ransom Payments, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/
2014/01/un-urges-end-ransom-payments-20141281206630778.html [https://perma.cc/Z9L2­
2U23] (quoting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Samantha Powers, as saying “[e]very ransom
paid to a terrorist organization encourages future kidnapping operations”). 
67. William Hague, Foreign Sec’y, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Address to 
the Security Council Briefing on Terrorism (Sept. 27, 2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
speeches/foreign-secretary-supports-un-efforts-against-terrorism-condemns-ransom­
payments-to-terrorists [https://perma.cc/V7MD-7AHC].
 68. David Cameron Says UK Won’t Pay Ransoms to Terrorists as Tayside Man Held
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Foley after the United States refused to release prisoners or pay the
requested ransom payment in the amount of around $130 million.69  By
contrast, French and Spanish journalists held hostage by ISIS were released, 
allegedly because the governments of the hostages paid sizable ransoms 
for their return.70 
Accordingly, in the short term, a policy that permits acceding to a 
ransom demand produces a benefit in that the lives of particular hostages
are saved. Yet, according to countries with no-concessions policies, the 
long-term benefits of abiding by their policy outweigh the short-term
benefits of paying.  In November 2014, the United States again argued 
that granting concessions puts “all American citizens overseas at greater
risk for kidnapping” and also “sustain[s] the very same terrorist organizations 
that we are working to destroy.”71  For those individuals or businesses 
who may want to pay a ransom for the release of a loved one, there is 
another long-term cost associated with the decision of some governments 
to pay hefty ransoms—the price of a ransom becomes so inflated that 
some will not be able to pay it.72
 69. See Rukimi Callimachi, For James Foley’s Family, U.S. Policy Offered No 
Hope, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/us/for-hostages­
family-us-policy-offered-no-hope.html?_r=0 (describing ISIS’s demand for a $130 million 
ransom and the release of certain prisoners in exchange for Mr. Foley’s safe release). 
70. France Denies Paying Ransom for Reporters Abducted in Syria, DAILY STAR
(Apr. 28, 2014, 12:12 AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Apr­
28/254608-france-denies-paying-ransom-for-reporters-abducted-in-syria.ashx [https://perma.cc/
RZ7E-FFBM] [hereinafter France Denies] (noting France’s denial that its Defense Minister
delivered $18 million in a suitcase to Ankara in exchange for the release of the four French
journalists); Timothy McGrath, These Are the Countries That Have (Probably) Paid Ransom
to the Islamic State, GLOBAL POST (Jan. 28, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/ 
dispatch/news/war/150121/these-are-the-countries-have-probably-paid-ransom-the-islamic­
state [https://perma.cc/WP6T-H893] (noting Spain’s denial that it paid a ransom for the
release of several Spanish journalists who were being held by ISIS); Conal Urquhart, 
Kidnapped French Journalists Released 10 Months After Abduction in Syria, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/19/kidnapped-french-journalists­
safe-turkey-syria-border [https://perma.cc/LB7X-ANWK] (describing the release of four
French journalists and a Spanish journalist who were being held by ISIS). 
71. Rick Gladstone, U.S. Agencies Review Policy on Hostages, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/world/middleeast/isis-hostages-us-reviews­
policies.html.
72. Julian Borger, Kim Willsher, & Steven Burgen, Terrorist Ransoms: Should 
Governments Pay Up or Stick to Their Principles?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2014, 3:26 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/aug/22/terrorist-ransom-government-pay-james-
foley [https://perma.cc/Z5P6-WN8F] (citing individuals who have been engaged in
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B. The Recent Calls for a Universal Terrorist Ransom Ban 
As the terrorists’ coffers have grown, so too have the calls to stand united 
in refusing to give in to their ransom demands.  U.K. Prime Minister 
David Cameron led the movement in June 2013, when he announced at 
the G8 Summit73 that he would seek a pledge from member countries agreeing 
to ban ransoms.74 The resulting pledge is memorialized in a G8 communiqué
that reads: 
We are committed to protecting the lives or our nationals and reducing terrorist 
groups’ access to the funding that allows them to survive and thrive in accordance 
with relevant international conventions.  We unequivocally reject the payment of
ransoms to terrorists in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009)
which requires that Member States prevent the payment of ransoms, directly or
indirectly, to terrorists designated under the UN Al Qaeda sanctions regime through
the freezing of funds and other assets. We welcome efforts to prevent kidnapping
and secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments, such as those 
recommended by the [Global Counterterrorism Forum], specifically in the Algiers 
Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of
Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists.75 
The referenced Algiers Memorandum issued by the Global Counterterrorism 
Forum recommends a set of “non-binding good practices for all states to 
consider implementing to prevent hostage-taking, keep the hostage safe, 
and deny terrorists the financial and other benefits from such actions.”76 
Among those good practices is denying terrorists “the benefits of
ransom—while seeking to secure the safe release of the hostage(s)—through
financial, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and other means and
resources, as appropriate, not excluding the use of force . . . .”77 
hostage negotiations with terrorist groups for the idea that ransom prices have become 
inflated, making negotiations more difficult). 
73. The G8 is an unofficial governmental forum of eight of the world’s leading
industrialized democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The group meets annually to discuss and address “major
economic and political issues facing member states and the international community.” 
FACTBOX: The Group of Eight: What Is It?, REUTERS (July 3, 2008, 5:49 AM),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/07/03/us-g8-group-idUKB26280520080703?sp=true
[https://perma.cc/4248-PVPF] [hereinafter The Group of Eight].  In March 2014, Russia
was suspended from the G8 because of its actions against in Ukraine.  Alison Smale & 
Michael D. Shear, Russia is Ousted from Group of 8 by U.S. and Allies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/world/europe/obama-russia-crimea.html?r=0.
74. See Steven Swinford, David Cameron Tells G8 Nations to Stop Paying 
Ransoms to Terrorists, TELEGRAPH (June 6, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/g8/10104374/David-Cameron-tells-G8-nations-to-stop-paying-ransoms- 
to-terrorists.html (quoting the Prime Minister as stating that he wanted countries “to sign 
up to a tangible agreement”).
75. G8 Communiqué, supra note 17, ¶¶ 76–77. 
76.  Algiers Memorandum, supra note 28, at 2. 
77.  Algiers Memorandum, supra note 28, at 4. 
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The UK followed with a proposal to the United Nations aimed at
operationalizing the June 18 Communiqué.78  The results of the UK’s 
efforts are memorialized in Security Council Resolution 2133, unanimously
adopted in January 2014.79  The resolution ostensibly creates “no new
legal obligations,” but was apparently “designed to increase political pressure 
on countries not to pay ransoms.”80  As to the prior legal obligations, the
Council “reaffirmed” “its resolution 1373 (2001)”81 and in particular its
“decision” that all States “prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist
acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to 
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts . . . .”82  It further “reaffirmed”
“its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that all States shall prohibit their 
nationals . . . from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources . . .
available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit . . . 
terrorist acts . . . .”83  As to ransom payments more specifically, the resolution 
“calls upon” all states “to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or 
indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure
the safe release of hostages.”84  It further “calls upon” states “to encourage 
private sector partners to adopt or to follow relevant guidelines and good 
78. Adoption of a Resolution on Terrorist Kidnapping for Ransom, WHAT’S IN 
BLUE (Jan. 24, 2014, 5:26 PM), http://www.whatsinblue.org/2014/01/adoption-of-a­
resolution-on-terrorist-kidnapping-for-ransom.php [https://perma.cc/4TGV-BB3Y]. 
79. Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Adopts Resolution
2133 (2014), Calling Upon States to Keep Ransom Payments, Political Concessions From 
Benefitting Terrorist (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11262.doc.htm. 
80. Michelle Nichols, U.N. Security Council Urges End to Ransom Payments to
Extremists, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2014, 5:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
01/27/us-kidnappings-ransoms-un-idUSBREA0Q1RI20140127 [https://perma.cc/XJF2-JMHR].
81. S.C Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  Resolution 1373 was a U.S.-led initiative, and
the Security Council passed the resolution unanimously only days after the events of 9/11 
as a logical next step in the Council’s counterterrorism efforts. Id.  Acting under Chapter 
VII, the Council imposed upon states obligations of a general character, requiring them to 
act to “prevent and suppress terrorist financing and refrain from providing any other form
of support to terrorist groups.”  Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN 
Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 284 
(2008); see also Andrea Bianchi, Assessing The Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s 
Anti-Terrorism Measures: The Quest For Legitimacy And Cohesion, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
881, 881–83 (2006); id. 
82.  S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 1 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
83. Id. ¶ 2.
84. Id. ¶ 3.
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practices for preventing and responding to terrorist kidnappings without 
paying ransoms.”85 
Additional resolutions referencing a ban on ransom payments have 
followed.  In both Resolutions 2170 (2014)86 and 2199 (2015),87 the Council
acted under Chapter VII to confirm—or reaffirm, in the case of Resolution 
2199—“that the requirements in paragraph 1(a) of resolution 2161 (2014)” 
“apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or 
entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, regardless of how or by whom the 
ransom is paid.”88  That paragraph of Resolution 216189 contains the
Council’s “decision” acting under Chapter VII that states “shall” freeze 
“the funds and other financial assets or economic resources” of al Qaeda 
or individuals or groups associated with them “and ensure that neither
these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made
available, directly or indirectly for such persons’ benefit, by their nationals or
by persons within their territory.”90  In Resolution 2199 (2015), the Council
further acted under Chapter VII to again “call upon” states “to prevent 
terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or 
from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages.”91 
Resolution 2199 also reiterates the Security Council’s prior “calls” to 
“encourage private sector partners to adopt or to follow relevant guidelines
and good practices for preventing and responding to terrorist kidnappings 
without paying ransom.”92 
C. Legally-Binding or Not: A Textual Analysis 
This section analyzes the language of the G8 Communiqué and the
various Security Council resolutions to assess the nature of the obligations 
they place upon states. This Article concludes that referenced measures
do not create clear, binding, and enforceable obligations that require states
to refuse to pay ransoms to terrorists or otherwise face sanctions or other 
coercive measures to ensure compliance.
Consider the limitations of the G8 Communiqué. It contains the pledge 
of only eight states.93 Nor is the pledge unambiguous as to the obligations
of those eight states.  The G8 state that they “unequivocally reject the payment
 85. Id. ¶ 10.
86.  S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
87.  S.C. Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
88.  S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 17 (Aug. 17, 2014); S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 19 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
89.  S.C. Res. 2161, ¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2014). 
90. Id.
91.  S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 20 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
92. Id. ¶ 19. 
93. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
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of ransoms to terrorists” and that they “welcome efforts to prevent kidnapping 
and secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments.”94 
While this language may be interpreted as a ban on ransoms, absent is a 
simple and clear promise never to pay a ransom to terrorists.  Even if the 
language was specific, the G8 is an informal institution with no law-making 
or enforcement powers.95  Moreover, it has been criticized in the past for 
failing to live up to its promises.96  In short, the G8 Communiqué does not
create a binding legal obligation to refrain from acceding to ransom
demands that can be enforced against states.97 
The Security Council is different: it can bind states.  Paragraph 1 of 
Article 24 of the UN Charter provides that the Security Council has the 
power to act on behalf of member states to maintain international peace
and security.98 In responding to a threat to international peace and security, 
the Council has powers under Chapter VII to authorize the use of force.99 
In addition, it has the power to “decide what measures not involving the 
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and 
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures.”100  On the other hand, under Article 25 of the Charter, member
states agree to carry out and accept only the Council’s “decisions”—as 
opposed to, for example, its “recommendations.”101  States are only required
94. G8 Communiqué, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 76–77.
95. RISTO E.J. PENTTILA, THE ROLE OF THE G8 IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE
&SECURITY 7 (2003); see also Peter Holcombe Henley & Niels M. Blokker, The Group of 
20: A Short Legal Anatomy from the Perspective of International Institutional Law, 14 
MELB. J. INT’L L. 550, 559–60 (2013) (stating that the G8 “remains an informal grouping
which aims to facilitate coordination, but falls short of requiring its members to commit to 
legally binding cooperation”).
96. Zachary Laub, Backgrounder: The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/international­
organizations-and-alliances/group-eight-g8-industrialized-nations/p10647 [https://perma. 
cc/T58T-XHG7] (noting that the failure of the G8 states to live up to their commitments 
has been the subject of much criticism and that accountability has accordingly become a 
larger part of the group’s current agenda).
97. Camilla Bausch & Michael Mehling, Chapter 6 Alternative Venues of Climate 
Cooperation: An Institutional Perspective, 21 IUS GENTIUM 111, 122 (2013) (stating that
the “G8 summits aim primarily to send political signals and set trends, and do not produce 
binding results”). 
98.  U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. 
99.  U.N. Charter art. 42. 
100.  U.N. Charter art. 41. 
101. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”);
 351












   
 
  
      
 
 
   
  










    
 








to comply with Council decisions, and then one must parse the language
used in any Council decision in order to determine the precise obligations 
to which states are bound.102 
Reviewing the language of the resolutions referenced above reveals that 
the Security Council has not clearly and unambiguously issued a decision
banning states or their citizens from meeting terrorist ransom demands. 
In Resolution 1373, the Council issued decisions that it later reaffirmed in
each of Resolutions 2133 and 2170.103  Those Resolution 1373 decisions,
however, do not explicitly reference ransom payments.104  Instead, the
decisions the Council “reaffirmed” are more general in nature.  One requires 
states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain
from providing any active or passive support to those involved in terrorist 
acts.105  The other requires states to prohibit nationals from making funds
available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons—or entities 
see also Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council 
and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 884 (2006)
(noting that Security Council “decisions” are binding on Member States, but that 
“recommendations” are not); Carsten Stahn, The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 
1422 (2002), 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 85, 102 (2003) (noting that Article 25 of the UN Charter 
only establishes a duty to carry out “decisions” by the Security Council). 
102. See Öberg, supra note 101, at 885 (citing to a decision of the International Court
of Justice for the proposition that “[w]hether a specific SC resolution is binding is
determined by the language used in it, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions 
invoked, etc.”); Stahn, supra note 101, at 101–02 (interpreting the language of a Security
Council resolution in order to reach conclusions about its binding effect).
103.  S.C. Res. 2133, ¶¶ 1–2 (Jan. 27, 2014); S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 11 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
104. Some commentators have argued that the Security Council does not have the 
mandate to act as a “global legislator” and issue resolutions like Resolution 1373 that
purport to impose general and far-reaching obligations on U.N. Member states so as to 
address threats posed by terrorism.  Essentially, the question is whether it is appropriate
for this small political body whose decisions are not reviewable to impose far-reaching
legal obligations upon states.  See Eric Rosand, The Security Council As “Global Legislator”: 
Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 542, 543 & n.5, 552, 573 (2005). 
Rosand, however, concludes that nothing in the U.N. Charter limits the Council from using
its Chapter VII powers in a legislative capacity. See id. at 559; see also Johnstone, supra
note 81, at 299 (“While the Security Council is first and foremost an executive body whose 
principle function is crisis management, no evident legal rule prohibits it from acting in a
legislative or quasi-judicial manner.”).  This Article does not engage with this debate and
instead assumes for its purposes that the Council had the power to issue its decisions in
Resolution 1373. 
105. See S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 1 (Jan. 27, 2014); S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 11 (2014); S.C. Res. 
1373, ¶¶ 1(a), 2(a) (Sept. 28, 2001). Resolution 1373, paragraph 1(a) states that the Council 
“[d]ecides that all States shall [p]revent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.”  S.C. 
Res. 1373, ¶ 1(a) (Sept, 28, 2001).  In paragraph 2(a), it “[d]ecides also that all States shall
[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons 
involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist 
groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists.”  S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2(a) (Sept. 
28, 2001). 
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owned or controlled by them or of persons or entities acting on their 
behalf—who commit or attempt to commit, facilitate, or participate in 
terrorist acts.106  One could argue that “ransoms” are necessarily included
within the phrases “providing active or passive support” or “making funds 
available.”107  On the other hand, states likely have a good argument that
Resolution 1373 did not bind them to a ransom ban given the lack of any 
explicit reference to ransoms.
Nor do the later resolutions referencing Resolution 1373 unequivocally 
set out a legally binding obligation to ban terrorist ransom payments. 
Resolutions 2133 and 2199 explicitly refer to “ransoms,” but not in the 
context of a “decision.”  In both, the Security Council “notes” “ransom
payments to terrorist groups are one of the sources of income that supports 
their recruitment efforts, strengthens their operational capability to organize 
and carry out attacks, and incentivizes future incidents of kidnapping from 
ransoms.”108  “Noting,” however, is not the same as a “deciding” to ban states
from paying ransoms.  Nor is it a clarification that ransom payments are 
included in the broad language of the Resolution 1373 decisions reference 
above. Resolution 2133 contains a further statement that “calls upon” 
states “to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from 
ransom payments.”109 Absent is the word “decides” prefacing this “call.”
Resolution 2199 is similar: it only “reiterates” the same “call” “to prevent
terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments.”110 
Resolution 2161 also contains decisions that the Security Council later 
“confirmed” or “reaffirmed,” in Resolutions 2170 and 2199, respectively.111 
Specifically, both resolutions state that the requirements of the Council’s
decision in paragraph 1(a) of Resolution 2161 shall also “apply to the
 106. See S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 2 (Jan. 27, 2014); S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(d) (Sept. 28, 2001). 
Resolution 1373, paragraph 1(d) states that the Council 
[d]ecides that all States shall [p]rohibit their nationals or any persons and entities 
within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic 
resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly,
for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or
participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on 
behalf of or at the direction of such persons. 
S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(d) (Sept. 28, 2001). 
107. See supra notes 105–06. 
108. See S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 7 (Jan. 27, 2014); S.C. Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
109. See S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 3 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
110.  S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 20 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
111. See discussion supra notes 86–90. 
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payment of ransoms.”112 In paragraph 1(a) of Resolution 2161, the Council
decided states must freeze the funds or assets of terrorists—no matter from
what source those funds or assets were obtained.113  Thus, the later resolutions
seem to clarify that the requirement to freeze assets also applies to ransom
payments.  Neither Resolution 2177 nor Resolution 2190 contains language
that definitively prohibits states from paying ransoms.  Perhaps the language
of these resolutions, taken together, means that if states learn of ransom
payments, they should freeze them or the assets of one who paid a ransom.
Again, if the Council wanted to clearly ban states from paying ransoms, it 
could have used precise language to do just that. 
The fact that states have paid terrorists more than $100 million in 
ransom payments since the Security Council issued Resolution 1373 also 
supports a conclusion that the measures discussed do not create a legally-
binding obligation to ban terrorist ransom payments.  Yet while research
revealed statements by government representatives and others criticizing 
these states for paying ransoms, research has not revealed any instance
where the Security Council or anyone else went on record saying that the 
payments were made in violation of Resolution 1373.114  If the Security 
Council believed it had banned states from paying ransoms by some language 
in Resolution 1373 or any of the later resolutions, should we expect it to
stand by silently?  It could have issued a statement pointing out that it had
issued a binding decision to which states must adhere.  It could have referenced
an enforcement mechanism that would be employed to hold states accountable
to banning terrorist ransoms. 
Finally, there is even less reason to believe that the G8 Communiqué or 
the Security Council resolutions legally bind states to ban their citizens 
from paying ransoms to terrorists.  The G8 have no authority to bind.115 
In any event, as to individuals, the Communiqué only “encourages” private 
sector parties to obtain the safe release of hostages without paying ransoms
through efforts such as those recommended in the Algiers Memorandum
issued by the Global Counterterrorism Task Force.116  The Security Council 
resolutions are similar in that they simply “encourage.”  In Resolution 2133, 
the Security Council “calls upon” states to “encourage” individuals to respond 
to kidnappings without paying ransoms.117  Resolution 2199, issued in
112.  S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 17 (Aug. 15, 2014); S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 19 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
113.  S.C. Res. 2161, ¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2014). 
114. See, e.g., Tom McTague, European Leaders to Be ‘Good to Their Word’ and
Stop Funding ISIS with Ransom Payments, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 3, 2014, 10:45 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2742272/Cameron-tells-European-leaders-good-
word-stop-funding-ISIS-ransom-payments.html. 
115.  Bausch & Mehling, supra note 97, at 122. 
116. G8 Communiqué, supra note 17, at ¶ 77. 
117.  S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 10 (Jan. 27, 2014).
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2015, is identically worded.118  These “calls” allow the states themselves
to decide whether to require their citizens to adhere to a terrorist ransom
ban. 




If the recent measures are not binding and enforceable, then do they
matter at all?  After all, at present, they do not serve as a basis to force
states or their citizens to refuse to pay ransoms.  This Article, however, 
argues that the recent measures matter, because they have the potential to 
impact behavior in a meaningful and constructive way in the future. The 
G8 Communiqué and the various Security Council resolutions mark a 
significant development: two influential international institutions are now 
urging states to implement a universal terrorist ransom ban as to themselves 
and their citizens. The United States and the United Kingdom have been 
vocal about their no-concessions policies, and they have sought to persuade 
others of the value of their positions.119  But the message of two states— 
even powerful states—arguably does not have the same persuasive force 
as a message backed more multilaterally. 
A. Norm Influence and the Terrorist Ransom Ban Measures 
This Article draws on the literature about norm influence to support its 
argument about the role the G8 Communiqué and the Security Council 
Resolutions can play in changing state and individual behavior as regards 
paying ransoms to terrorists.  In their influential article addressing the role 
norms play in political change, Finnemore and Sikkink define a norm as 
“a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”120 
They suggest that we can identify “appropriate” behavior by reference to
the judgment of a particular society or community: norm-breaking behavior
generates disapproval or stigma, while norm-adhering behavior does not.121 
On the other hand, what is appropriate can vary not only with societies or 
118.  S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 19 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
119. See, e.g., Boucher, supra note 9 (describing the U.S. policy not to pay ransoms);
Deardon, supra note 9 (referencing the UK’s 40-year-old no-concessions policy). 
120. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 891. 
121. Id. at 891–92. 
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communities, but also over time.122  In other words, new norms can emerge
and spread. Scholars have suggested a three-stage process: the first stage
is norm emergence; the second stage is norm diffusion, where a critical 
mass of actors agree to abide by the emerging norm; and the last stage is
the institutionalization stage, where the new norm is robust enough that 
actors reflexively conform to it.123  Nevertheless, as Finnemore and Sikkink
caution, completing this norm “life cycle” is not guaranteed; many emergent 
norms will not reach a stage of mass diffusion.124 
The two elements that scholars tend to agree must be present in order
for a new norm to emerge and spread are norm entrepreneurs and
organizational platforms.125 Norm entrepreneurs are agents who use 
information about the nature of a problem and arguments about the problem’s 
importance in an effort to persuade others of the need for a new norm.126 
They feel compelled to advocate for a new norm and new standard of
conduct when they become dissatisfied with an existing state of affairs.127 
To persuade other critical actors to change their behavior, “norm entrepreneurs 
should possess powerful and convincing rhetorical and communicative 
skills.”128 
The organizational platform is critical to the norm entrepreneur’s ability
to reach the second and third stages in the norm life cycle: diffusion and 
institutionalization.  Organizational platforms come in different forms.
They can be international institutions, such as the United Nations.  They 
can also be non-governmental organizations.129  In all cases, though, the
platform must be one that provides the entrepreneur with access to critical
audiences that can help to promote the norm.130 That organizational platform
also should give the norm entrepreneur access to the organization’s expertise
122. The word “appropriately” references the “logic of appropriateness,” whereby
actors are driven by what is right, as opposed to what might be demanded of them or 
legally required.  See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Logic of Appropriateness, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 689–90 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2008). 
123. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 895, 898; Knight, supra note 23, at 18. 
124. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 895. 
125. Id. at 896; Darren Hawkins & Joshua Lloyd, Questioning Comprehensive 
Sanctions: The Birth of a Norm, 2 J. HUM. RTS. 441, 442 (2003). 
126.  Hawkins & Lloyd, supra note 125, at 442. 
127. Knight, supra note 23, at 18. 
128. Id. See also Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 897 (“The construction of
cognitive frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’ political strategies, 
since, when they are successful, the new frames resonate with broader public understandings 
and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues.”). 
129. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 900. 
130. See, e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 900 (suggesting that the 
organizational platform should allow access to an audience); Hawkins & Lloyd, supra note 
125, at 442 (suggesting that organizational platforms should enable the norm entrepreneur
to distribute information).
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and information so as help influence behavior—to make norm breakers 
into norm followers.131  In the international context, norm entrepreneurs
and their networks will use both praise of conforming behavior and 
ridicule of non-conforming behavior to socialize other relevant actors and
persuade them to adopt the new policy.132 
Consider the G8 Communiqué and the Security Council resolutions in 
this context. Prime Minister Cameron has acted as a norm entrepreneur.
He has persuaded the G8 members and the Security Council to push
through measures referencing a more universal preference for refusing to 
pay ransoms to terrorists.  These measures have altered the previous 
landscape, one where two states essentially stood alone in their resolve to 
follow a strict no-concessions policy despite the costs in terms of lives
lost in the short term.  The G8 states publicly pledged that they would not
pay ransoms.  The Security Council Resolutions contain relatively strong 
wording in that they “urge” states to refuse to pay ransoms.  Though neither 
measure is legally binding, each is a step in the road towards adopting a more
universal norm of rejecting ransoms to terrorists. 
Furthermore, there are now two organizational platforms promoting the 
new norm that norm entrepreneurs can leverage to pursue further efforts 
to persuade states to commit to a ransom ban, not only in theory, but also 
in practice.  Indeed, Prime Minister Cameron has leveraged the G8 platform
to help socialize relevant actors to the new norm by bringing attention to 
non-conforming behavior.  In September 2014, the prime minister called 
out France and Germany for paying ransoms to ISIS and implored them 
to be “good to their word”—the pledge they made as part of the G8
Communiqué.133 
None of this means that the norm of banning ransoms to terrorists will 
be quickly adopted or institutionalized by a greater number of states.  This 
stage of norm emergence may never materialize into something greater.
On the other hand, there is now a foundation for interested stakeholders 
to push forward an agenda of persuading states of the value of changing
their behavior.  And at least one study indicates that this very type of non-
binding “urging” by the Security Council has served to promote normative 
change over time.  Professor of Law Cora True-Frost found that the adoption 
of some non-binding Security Council resolutions addressing non-situation­
131. 
132. 
See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 22, at 899, 902. 
Id. at 902. 
133. McTague, supra note 114. 
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specific human security concerns helped bring about actual changes in 
behavior.134 
For example, in one case study, True-Frost examined the effects of 
Security Council Resolution 1325 “calling upon” and “urging” states to
increase women’s participation in U.N. conflict and peacekeeping
operations.135  A transnational advocacy network of women’s organizations
had successfully lobbied the Council to adopt this resolution in 2000.136 
Among other developments, True-Frost found that Resolution 1325 prompted
“roundtables, trainings and gender awareness sessions for Security Council 
members, UN agencies, and grassroots activists.”137  “Members of civil society 
have also leveraged Resolution 1325 to support their advocacy and to 
secure funding for women’s programs.”138  On the national level, among 
other things, True-Frost found evidence that some states had developed 
action plans to implement Resolution 1325.139  However, a word of caution 
is in order: True-Frost did not find that the Resolution quickly resulted in 
some ideal outcome with women equally participating in peacekeeping and 
conflict matters.140 Nevertheless, positive change did occur despite the
absence of coercive legally binding pronouncements. 
B. Considering the Alternative: Force Instead of Persuasion 
This Article argues that the only realistic avenue to produce any significant 
behavioral change in this context is through persuasion, as opposed to
force. As an initial matter, there is little reason to expect that the relevant 
states would have backed a G8 communiqué or a Security Council resolution 
that clearly banned them or their citizens from paying terrorist ransoms.
The G8 issues communiqués only when its member states agree.  In the 
case of the Security Council, any of the five permanent members (P5)141 
can veto any substantive action of the Council, including resolutions issued
134. C. Cora True-Frost, The Security Council and Norm Consumption, 40 INT’L L.
& POL. 115, 121 (2007) (stating that the resolutions in some cases brought about “the 
prescribed normative behavior” and in other cases, “undeniably provided a discursive
framework for the development and implementation of the relevant norms”). 




See id. at 146–47 (describing in detail the provisions contained in Resolution 
Id. at 154. 
137. Id. at 160. 
138. Id. at 162. 
139. Id. at 164–65. 
140. 
141. 
See, e.g., id. at 167–68. 
The P5 includes China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
[https://perma.cc/2M3P-BVGS] (last visited June 12, 2016).
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to carry out its powers under Chapter VII.142  Research has not revealed any
evidence—like contemporaneous statements from European leaders— 
showing that they support a binding ban backed by enforcement mechanisms
so as to tie their hands to commit them to new behavior.  In fact, France 
is a member of both the G8 and P5, and states have accused it of paying 
ransoms even after the passage of the G8 Communiqué.143 
The likely absence of broad state support for a legally binding ransom
ban is not the only reason why proceeding by way of persuasion, instead
of force, makes sense.  Persuasion avoids a host of practical and ethical
concerns associated with trying to force states and their citizens to adhere 
to a strict policy of not paying ransoms to terrorists.  Below, this Article
addresses such concerns relating to the enforcement of a hypothetical 
legally binding terrorist ransom ban directed at (1) state governments and 
(2) individuals. 
1. Obstacles to a Legally-Binding Terrorist Ransom 
Ban Directed at Governments 
The obstacles to a legally-binding terrorist ransom ban directed at 
governments are both practical and ethical.  As a practical matter, there is 
the ease with which states can evade such a ban and the corresponding
difficulty of obtaining evidence of such evasion.  States have paid ransoms 
in the past, and they will likely be unable to resist the temptation to continue 
to pay unless they become convinced that the only right course of action 
is to refuse to pay ransoms in order to save future lives.  If instead they
believe that the only right and ethical behavior is saving the life of an
innocent hostage, a ban will serve as little deterrent.  And when states do 
pay ransoms, they do not do so openly; they often deliver cash in suitcases.144 
Tracking cash moved in suitcases, rather than through banking channels, 
is not an easy matter. Such tactics allow those who pay to avoid leaving 
142. See U.N. Charter art. 27 (stating that substantive decisions of the Security
Council require the affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of 
the permanent members); see also Asad Hashim, Veto Power at the UN Security Council,
ALJAZEERA (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/02/2012251
52330761377.html [https://perma.cc/Y2Y4-NTPV] (reporting that only the permanent
five members of the Security Council have the power to veto the Council’s resolutions). 
143. See, e.g., McTague, supra note 114 (calling out France, among other states, for 
paying ransoms to ISIS); Millions Paid, supra note 56 (reporting that France paid ransoms 
to AQIM for the release of French citizens).
144. See, e.g., supra note 2.
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an evidentiary trail.145  The Security Council may not be able to create— 
or willing to devote the resources necessary to create—a monitoring
mechanism strict enough to enable it to find credible evidence of a
government’s ransom payment. 
The Financial Action Task Force’s February 2015 Report addressing 
ISIL’s financing explains the difficulty of tracking ransom payments generally.
It states:
Exact figures with respect to how much ISIL has earned from ransom payments
are difficult to assess and often intentionally kept secret since ransom payments
often originate from private companies that wish to conceal the transaction, or are
otherwise paid in cash, making the transactions difficult for financial institutions 
to identify.146 
If the FATF has difficulty tracking individual payments, imagine the 
difficulty of tracking the payments of a sovereign state.  Some people in 
government may be willing to tell a reporter that their government paid,
but this does not mean that the government will permit the Security Council
or other states to review its financial records. Even if governments did 
agree to such a review procedure, they could hide the payment under any 
line item not entitled “ransom payment.” 
Indeed, enforcement is always more difficult in the international arena 
than in the domestic.  National prosecutors have many tools at their 
disposal to aid them in bringing those who commit crimes to justice.  They
can subpoena documents and witnesses. They can apply for search warrants. 
Also, when national prosecutors obtain an arrest warrant, they can have
that warrant executed by a police force. In the international context, states
cannot generally force other states to turn over evidence implicating their 
leadership in bad or criminal behavior.  Nor is there an international police 
force to arrest offenders. The international arena, instead, depends on 
state cooperation.
There are also reasons to believe that neither the Security Council nor 
individual states would want to bear the ethical burden of forcing another
state to refuse to accede to terrorist ransom demands.  The usual result of 
the refusal to pay is that the state’s citizen suffers a gruesome and often 
widely publicized death. Urging states and citizens to refuse to pay ransoms 
because doing so serves the greater goals of depriving terrorists of funding 
and the motivation for future kidnappings is different from forcing one 
not to pay a ransom.  When one “urges,” as opposed to “forces,” one does 
not assume the ultimate decision of whether to pay or not.  By allowing 
145. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION ISLAMIC
STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL) 18 (2015). 
146. Id. 
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the state to decide on its own to follow a no-concessions policy, the 
Security Council and states may then feel that they can absolve themselves 
of the ethical responsibility for the death of another state’s citizens. 
2. Obstacles to a Legally Binding Terrorist Ransom Ban 
Directed at Individuals 
There are also obstacles to adopting a legally binding terrorist ransom
ban directed at individuals. One practical problem relates to enforcing any 
ban on terrorist ransoms directed at individuals. In the domestic context, 
as noted, states do have resources to gather evidence of criminal behavior 
and arrest offenders.  However, laws are also supposed to deter individuals
from committing crimes because individuals would rather not be punished.147 
One can imagine that the threat of imprisonment would not deter a great
number of parents from paying a ransom if doing so meant that their child
might not be murdered by terrorists.  In fact, some parents of hostages
have said as much in response to threats that they “risked prosecution if 
they paid terrorists or tried to persuade an allied power to do so.”148  The
father of Jim Foley stated that he would rather be in prison if he could 
have his son home.149 The mother of another hostage said, “Let them put
me in jail.”150 
Force and threats likely will not induce parents to refuse to accede to
ransom demands when the alternative is the possibility that their child will 
die at the hands of terrorists.  Persuasion, though, might prove to be an
effective tactic.  Why? If parents are convinced that paying terrorists is
the wrong thing to do because it fuels further terrorist acts and puts others
at risk of being held hostage in the future, then maybe parents themselves 
will choose not to pay.  Here, too, the comments of the parents of some 
individuals recently being held hostage by terrorists are helpful. One set 
of parents reported staying “up late worrying about the morality of giving 
money to a terrorist group—yet their only child’s life was at stake, and 
147. See, e.g., Raymond Pasternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About  
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010) (“The concept of
deterrence is quite simple—it is the omission of a criminal act because of the fear of 
sanctions or punishment.”). 
























     
  
 
   
   
    
  
   
 
 
   
     
      
   
 
 
    
   
 
ISIS was already rich.”151  The mother of hostage Kayla Mueller said that 
she did not want ISIS to receive another cent and that she did not think
her daughter would want them to either.152 
However, even if threats to prosecute could deter family members from 
seeking to pay a ransom, there are moral and ethical reasons why a state
should not criminally sanction individuals who succumb to ransom demands. 
In fact, punishing those who pay under duress would not be consistent
with the retributive principles of the criminal law.  Ordinarily, the criminal
law punishes those who deserve it.153  Individuals who pay ransoms to
kidnappers pay under duress—in response to a threat to kill the hostage,
and not with the intention to further criminal activity.154  When someone
acts under duress, they act because of fear or coercion.  They do something 
in response to a threat by another to make her worse off than she would 
have been otherwise.155  Although the ransom payment may necessarily 
assist the kidnapper, the payer does not make the payment with the criminal
intent to assist in unlawful activities.  Nor does the payer share any illegal 
profits with the kidnappers.  In short, the one who pays a ransom to a 
kidnapper is a victim.  Not unlike the victim of a robbery who gives up a 
wallet to avoid being harmed, she gives up money in order to avoid the 
execution of an innocent hostage.156 
Nor may states be prepared to treat individuals who pay ransoms to
terrorists differently than they treat individuals who pay ransoms to “ordinary”
criminals.157  In fact, the United States has never brought a case against 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91 
(2010) (explaining that retribution is a theory that justifies punishment “because and only
because offenders deserve it”).
154. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and
Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1341 (1989).  Generally, for the 
duress defense to be available, the threat must come from a person and be an unlawful
threat to imminently cause death or great bodily harm to a human being. Id. at 1339. 
155. Although this Article specifically discusses the law of the United States, it bears 
noting that other countries following the common law or civil law traditions generally
require “criminal intent” and the absence of defenses like “duress” in order to criminally
punish. See, e.g., Marcus Dirk Dubber, Comparative Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1319 (2012) (describing German criminal law as
requiring criminal intent, as well as the absence of justification or excuse defenses). 
156. See, e.g., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE,
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: REFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON TERROR 23 n.157 (Mark
Fleming et al. eds., 2006) (“In the criminal context, an individual forced to give money or
goods to an armed group would be considered a victim of criminal extortion, not a 
participant in the crime under U.S. criminal law.”). 
157. Necessity is a defense to criminal liability similar to duress in that it justifies or 
excuses the actor’s otherwise criminal behavior. In the United States, however, the necessity
defense is typically available only in response to natural forces: for example, when one 
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any of its citizens arguing that by paying a ransom, they have violated the 
law prohibiting providing “material support” to a terrorist organization.158 
Yet the United States adheres to a strict no-concessions policy and urges
its citizens to also not accede to ransom demands.  Also, the language of 
the “material support” provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is arguably broad 
enough to include ransom payments.159 That law criminalizes the conduct 
of knowingly providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization 
(FTO) or attempting or conspiring to do the same.160 “Material support”
includes providing currency, monetary instruments, or financial securities.161 
Based on the language of Section 2339B and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, one can be criminally
liable for financing terrorism if the prosecution shows that the person
providing support knew that she was giving money to a designated FTO— 
without also showing the person intended to further unlawful activities.162 
In Humanitarian Law Project, some individuals and organizations 
challenged the constitutionality of section 2339B’s “material support” 
commits a crime that would constitute the lesser of two evils in response to a naturally
caused condition, such as a hurricane. See Dressler, supra note 154, at 1347–48.  This 
Article confines its discussion of United States law to the duress defense.
 158. See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the U.S.
Gov’t’s Hostage Policy Review (June 24, 2015), [hereinafter White House Press Release] 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/24/statement-president-us-governments-
hostage-policy-review [https://perma.cc/BLG4-ADDS] (pointing out “that no family of an
American hostage has ever been prosecuted for paying a ransom for the return of their loved
ones”).
159. The “material support” provisions are contained in the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
(codified at scattered sections of 28, 21 and 18 U.S.C.).  One provision, section 2339A, 
makes it a federal crime to provide “material support” knowing or intending that such 
support is to be used in preparation for, or to carry out, specified crimes of terrorism.  18 
U.S.C. § 2339A (2012). Section 2339B criminalizes the broader conduct of knowingly
providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), or attempting or
conspiring to do the same.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). 
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (emphasis added).  FTOs are foreign organizations that 
engage in terrorist activities or terrorism that threatens the security interests of the United
States and that the Secretary of States has designated as such according to procedures set
forth in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  An up-to-date list of those 
who have been designated as FTOs is available on the U.S. State Department’s website. 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/
123085.htm [https://perma.cc/WF2A-TNSX] (last visited June 12, 2016).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) (referencing the 
definition of “material support” in section 2339A).
162.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
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provision, arguing among other things that the provision violated their
First Amendment right of freedom of speech and association because it
failed to require the government to prove that they had a specific intent to 
further the unlawful ends of the designated FTOs.  Instead, they stated that 
they only wanted to provide training and assistance to support the lawful
and nonviolent activities of two groups that were on the FTO list—groups 
that, although they had committed some terrorist attacks, also worked
towards establishing independent states for the Kurds in Turkey and the 
Tamils in Sri Lanka.163  However, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the statute was constitutional “as to the particular activities plaintiffs [say]
they wish to pursue.”164 
Although it declined to “address the resolution of more difficult cases 
that may arise under the statute,” the Humanitarian Law Project court did 
explain why the statute could properly subject to criminal liability even 
those persons who did not intend to further unlawful activities of those 
designated as FTOs.165  First, the Court noted that by the language of the
statute, “Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation 
of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection 
to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist
activities.”166  It further noted that a review of the statute’s legislative history 
showed that both Congress and the Executive Branch had determined that 
“providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization—
even seemingly benign support—bolsters the terrorist activities of that 
organization.”167  The Court echoed that determination when it stated: 
Material support meant to “promot[e] peaceable, lawful, conduct” . . . can further
terrorism by foreign groups in multiple ways.  “Material support” is a valuable
resource by definition.  Such support frees up other resources within the organization 
that may be put to violent ends.  It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign 
terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to
recruit members, and to raise funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.168 
The absence of a “material support” criminal case based on a ransom
payment could mean that no citizen has ever acceded to a terrorist ransom
demand, or that the United States government does not have sufficient 
evidence to prove such a payment beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, 
this Article suggests that the absence of such charges has more to do with 
the ethical dilemma associated with bringing criminal charges against one
 163. Id. at 7–11. 
164. Id. at 8. 
165. Id.
 166. Id. at 16–17. 
167. Id. at 36. 
168. Id. at 30. 
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who pays under duress to save the life of an innocent victim. The
circumstances regarding the Foley case are illustrative. As noted, some
government representatives allegedly threatened to bring criminal charges 
against the parents if they paid a ransom.169  But when the press reported 
the alleged threats, the government denied making them.  In fact, Secretary
of State Kerry responded to the allegations regarding the threat of 
prosecution by saying that he was unaware of such threats and would not 
condone anyone making such statements.170  The matter seems settled—
at least for now.  In June 2015, President Obama publicly promised that 
the United States would not use the “material support” law to punish the 
families of hostages who accede to ransom demands.  The reasons he gave
for his promise have an ethical ring to them. The president said “the last thing
we should ever do is add to a family’s pain with threats [to prosecute].”171 
Finally, consider the ethical dilemma associated with criminalizing 
terrorist ransom payments from the perspective of a prosecutor and jury— 
namely, putting in place a system that “forces” a ransom ban.  Even 
prosecutors who are firmly convinced that ransom payments fund and fuel 
terrorism and put future lives at risk may not feel they are doing the right
thing in bringing a case against someone who paid a ransom to save a
family member, friend, or colleague from being executed by terrorists. 
And prosecutors have some control over what cases they choose to bring. 
Nor are juries likely to believe that convicting someone in these circumstances 
is the right thing to do.  Should the duress defense be unavailable, the jury
will still learn about the circumstances surrounding the ransom payment 
and know that the defendant paid in response to a threat to kill.  Under 
such circumstances, can we imagine a jury reaching a unanimous verdict 
of guilty? Jury nullification is a reality.172
 169. See Ross et al., supra note 64 (referencing the Foley’s statement that they had 
been threatened with prosecution by government representatives); David Rohde, Will
Obama’s New Hostage Policy Actually Work?, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2015) (stating that 
senior officials in the White House and State Department repeatedly warned families of 
hostages that they could be prosecuted if they acceded to the terrorists’ ransom demands). 
170.  Ross et al., supra note 64. 
171. See White House Press Release, supra note 158.
172. Jury nullification is the jury’s refusal to follow the law as charged by the judge, 
for example, because they believe the law is unfair or they do not like how it is being 
applied to a particular defendant.  Joan Biskupic, In Jury Rooms, Form of Civil Protest 
Grows, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1999, at A1. 
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V. THE WAY FORWARD: MORE PERSUASION
States are right to want to do something about the problem posed by
terrorist groups’ increased use of kidnapping for ransom as a method of 
financing their illegal organizations.  Implementing a no-concessions policy
is one way to address the problem.  Moreover, states that favor such a policy
make persuasive arguments about the potentially positive effects of their 
stance: they argue that when terrorists learn that kidnapping will not pay,
they will be deterred from using KFR as a fundraising tactic.  As Under 
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, David Cohen, puts it: 
“[r]efusing to pay ransoms or to accede to other terrorist demands is the
surest way to convince potential hostage-takers that they will not be 
rewarded for their crime.”173 
This Article argues that the G8 Communiqué and the various Security
Council resolutions represent a significant step towards adopting a more
universal norm of banning both states and individuals from paying 
ransoms to terrorists.  Even though these measures are not legally binding, 
they offer a platform from which norm entrepreneurs can use diplomacy
to change behavior over the long term.  Key to such future change, however, 
is continued diplomacy so as to persuade states and individuals that not
paying ransoms is the appropriate or right thing to do. 
What can the norm entrepreneurs do?  Leaders in Britain and the United 
States can seek out other partners in their quest for a ransom ban.  They 
can organize roundtables with state leaders and relevant government and
non-governmental organizations. During these roundtables, participants 
can share information about terrorist organizations, hostage taking, and
how terrorist organizations use KFR to fund their illegal activities.  Roundtables 
or similar organized meetings would also provide an opportunity to those 
who are inclined to pay ransoms to share their concerns with a ransom
ban.  If the proponents of a ban better understand the objections to a ban,
then they can address those objections with arguments and evidence. 
Leaders in Britain and the United States can also attempt to persuade in 
more one-on-one settings.  Leaders can make it a priority when meeting
with their counterparts in other states to discuss the problem of ransom
payments and the reasons why not paying is ethically justified.  These 
leaders must convince those who have previously paid ransoms that giving
money to terrorists—even under duress—is wrong because it fuels their
illegal operations. They must also convince those who have previously
paid that not paying saves more lives in the future because it sends a 
message that kidnapping will not pay.  One way to make these messages
more persuasive is to back them up with additional data.  States behind a
173. Cohen Statement, supra note 10. 
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ransom ban should arm themselves with current data about the amount of
money terrorists receive from ransoms, as well as current data on the
amount of money terrorists need in order to stage attacks.  States supporting
a ransom ban would also have a better chance of convincing others to stop
paying if they could produce evidence—even anecdotal evidence—to
support arguments that cutting off ransom funds would convince terrorists 
to seek other ways to obtain funding. 
To pay or not to pay a ransom to a terrorist poses an ethical dilemma.
One should not underestimate the amount of dialogue and persuasive 
argument that will be required to convince states and individuals that 
refusing to succumb to a ransom demand is the right thing to do.  After all,
the evidence suggests that refusing to pay results in the death of an innocent 
person. 
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